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The value chain is a concept that could provide a
meeting ground for economics, business
administration and industrial sociology in the
study of one important aspect of globalisation,
namely the simultaneous economic integration of
countries and disintegration of production
processes.t Most research on value chains so far has
been done by non-economists. This note, by
contrast, looks at value chains from the perspective
of economics.2 It starts by reviewing what
economists can learn from other disciplines and
then considers what economics may have to offer
to other disciplines, both in understanding value
chains and in formulating policies to spread the
gains from globalisation.
Three important things that economists should
learn from the research of other scholars on value
chains are:
To look beyond manufacturing, mining and
agriculture into the other sectors and stages of
activity involved in the supply of goods to
consumers. Economists of course know that
other sectors exist, and pay increasing attention
to, for example, research and development
(R&D) and trade in services, but they have
probably not paid enough attention to
distribution and marketing, whose cost often
accounts for a larger share of the final price of a
good than the costs of its manufacture.
To examine flows of information as well as of
objects between the stages of activity in the
supply chain, and to pay attention to non-arms-
length linkages between the firms involved.
Economists tend to see coordination as
costlessly achieved by anonymous markets,
whereas in reality complex international supply
chains need active management, involving skills
and knowledge that are scarce and command
large financial rewards.
To treat the characteristics of goods, production
technology and the market at each stage of the
chain as endogenously determined rather than
exogenously given. Economists tend to view
firms (and countries) as optimising subject to
the constraints imposed by fixed markets,
products and technologies, whereas the main
strategic aim of most businessmen is apparently
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to improve their markets, products and
technologies.
What economics may have to add to the
contribution of other disciplines in the study of
value chains can be considered under two broad
headings: accounting and causation.
1 Accounting
Value chains are related to inputoutput tables. In
principle, with such tables for all countries in the
world, a 'value chain' could be calculated for each
final good sold in each country This would be an
exhaustive decomposition of its price into the value
added in each of the sectors and countries that had
contributed, directly or indirectly, to its supply
(value added being the sum of wages, profits and
natural resource rents) The list of sectors and
countries in most such chains would be very long
and many of the items on it very small, for example
the value added in the electric power sector of the
country in which a minor agricultural raw material
was produced. For most goods and most countries,
moreover, only a small share of value would be
added outside the country in which the final good
was supplied.
It might well be argued that most such accounting
decompositions are not value chains in the
relevant sense (even disregarding all items which
account for less than, say, 1 per cent of the final
price). In particular, it might be argued that the
concept of a value chain should be limited to the
subset of accounting chains within which there is
some overt coordination among the activities at
different stages of the chain - some form of
'governance', whether by a single dominant firm
or by a coalition or network of firms. This would
mean excluding all the accounting chains in which
the relationships between stages consisted simply
of arms-length buying and selling in competitive
markets.
Nonetheless, it seems helpful to place value chains
more narrowly conceived in the context of a
complete (albeit hypothetical) accounting
decomposition of the value of all products among
sectors and countries, precisely because it obliges
attention to be given to the definition and scope of
value chains. Thus, for example, since all
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accounting chains are mixtures, to some degree, of
overt control and transactions in anonymous
markets, it leads us to ask how much governance
and of what sort (e.g. must it cross national
boundaries?) is required for part or all of an
accounting chain to be classified as a value chain. It
also reminds us that, even with the narrower
definition, there are a huge number of value chains
- far too many for all of them to be studied
individually It reveals relationships between chains:
that two or more chains may be competing for the
same raw material or the same customers. And it
leads us naturally to ask how large a share of world
production is now (or in the future likely to be)
within value chains, and to relate value chains to
other forms of economic activity
A rather different sort of accounting is helpful,
indeed essential, for linking the focus of most
analyses of value chains, namely firms, to the subject
of principal interest to those concerned with policy
namely people. In other words, policymakers are
concerned to spread the gains from globalisation
among people and households, with the outcomes
for firms being of only incidental or instrumental
interest. A step in this direction is to split the value
added in each firm between profits and wages, and to
split the wage bill into wage rates and employment of
workers of varying levels of skill. A simple
accounting decomposition of this sort, assuming
only two skill categories of worker, would be:
V/N = y = rk + s.w (1 - s)w0
This divides the firms value added, V (the value of
sales or output less the cost of materials), by the
number of workers it employs, N, to obtain its value
added per worker, y. This is then expressed as the
sum of profits per worker (capital per worker, k,
times the rate of profit on capital, r) and wages per
worker, the latter being a weighted average of the
skilled wage rate, w5, and the unskilled wage rate,
w, in which the weights are the shares of skilled
workers, s, and unskilled workers, (1 - s), in the
firm's employment, N. What policymakers
particularly care about are the levels of w5 and w
(and perhaps the difference between them), and the
levels of employment of both skilled workers, sN,
and unskilled workers, (1 - s)N. It is clear from the
equation that these variables of interest to
policymakers cannot immediately be inferred from
the value added of a firm, either in total (\' or per
worker (y).
The interest of policy-makers in the levels of w and
w depends also, of course, on the level of the
prices of consumer goods in the country concerned,
which determines the purchasing power of (or
living standard achievable with) a given money
wage rate. It is thus important in value-chain
analysis to recognise that price levels vary greatly
between countries, being in general higher in
countries where wages are higher (since labour
accounts for most of the cost of non-traded goods
and services) Wage rates therefore vary less among
countries in real terms than in money terms (when
converted into, say, US dollars at the official
exchange rate). The smallness of the shares of
developing countries in most value chains, as
compared with the large shares of developed
countries, is thus misleading in terms of the
distribution of the real gains from involvement in
these chains.
At the same time, however, it would be a serious
mistake in value-chain analysis to lose sight of
money wages, which are what firms care about and
what their decisions depend on. In particular, the
choices of transnational firms or networks of firms
about where to locate each stage of the supply chain
depend on the dollar wages' of countries, not on
their real wages. It is thus necessary in value-chain
analysis to consider both sorts of wages, and to be
aware of possible changes in the relationship
between them - which depends on how official
exchange rates move in relation to purchasing
power parity' rates, both in the short term, as a
result of, say, volatile capital flows, and in the long
term (successful development causes a country
exchange rate to appreciate, so that its dollar wages
rise by more than its real wages).
2 Causation
Various causal questions can be asked about value
chains. The most obvious to an economist is
probably what determines the allocation and
remuneration of activities among countries within
chains?' The obviousness of this question is a result
of much of the economic theory of international
trade being addressed to a similar question, though
without reference to value chains, and having a
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well-developed answer to it, which in short is
comparative advantage, reciprocal demand, and
transport costs'. The first of these three principles
determines which countries export which goods,
the second determines the terms of trade between
them and the third limits the economically optimal
degree of specialisation through trade.
Two economic theories of what determines
comparative advantage are of obvious relevance to
value chains. One stresses differences among
countries in resource supplies - for example, that
raw materials come from countries with suitable
land and that labour-intensive stages of production
tend to be located in countries with low wages. The
other stresses differences in technology - that
countries tend to specialise in activities about which
their inhabitants are especially knowledgeable.
These two theories make extreme and opposite
assumptions about international diffusion of
technical knowledge, the former supposing
knowledge to be freely available everywhere, the
latter that particular bits of knowledge are locked
up in particular countries.5 An intermediate
position that seems even more relevant to value
chains would be that knowledge can move from
one country to another, but only at a price (e.g.
payment of royalties - explicit or implicit in transfer
prices - or of the salaries of foreign experts). This
approach has been neglected by economists (but
see Markusen 1997; Wood 2000).
It might reasonably be objected that the standard
economic analysis of trade misses important issues
in value chains by assuming that all transactions are
made at prices set by competitive and anonymous
markets, whereas in reality many prices are set in
direct negotiation between firms at different stages
of the chain, who are tied to one another by long-
term contracts (and sometimes by common
ownership). However, economic models of
bargaining suggest that negotiated prices usually fall
within bands set by the forces which would
determine prices in competitive markets. Bargain-
ing models also help to understand where, within
such a band, the actual price is likely to be
established - the key determinant being the relative
quality of the fall-back options of the bargaining
parties in the event of a breakdown of the
negotiations. Potential competition between
alternative buyers and alternative sellers thus
continues to play an important role, even in what
appear to be non-competitive markets.
Another question about value chains is why some
countries are involved in so many of them, while
other countries (particularly developing countries)
are involved in so few. Economics has two answers
to offer. One concerns transport costs and other
barriers to trade (including not only tariffs and
quotas but also basic considerations such as
language, laws, finance and personal security):
countries where these barriers are high, for
whatever reason, will tend to be less involved in all
sorts of international trade, including trade within
value chains. This answer has clear and convent-
ional implications for policy. The other answer is
externalities and economies of clustering: the more
chains a country is already involved in, the easier is
it to become involved in additional chains, because
there are economies of scale in the supply of
infrastructure, skilled labour, support services and
information. This answer has different implications
for policy, favouring more active intervention to
attract and retain internationally footloose activities
of sorts in which a country has a potential
comparative advantage.
A central focus and policy aim of much recent
value-chain work is the upgrading of firms in
developing countries. This approach raises several
questions which invite economic analysis.
One concerns the consequences of the upgrading of
firms for the well-being of people, which returns to
an issue raised earlier in this note. To upgrade a
particular firm in a particular sector of one country
would increase its profitability, but would be
unlikely to raise the wages of its workers, since
these are determined in the entire labour market of
which the firm is a small part. If the upgrading
enabled the firm to enlarge its share of the market
for its output, its level of employment would rise,
unless the gain in market share was achieved
mainly by an increase in labour productivity
However, to the extent that its gain in market share
was achieved at the expense of other firms in the
same sector of that country employment in the
sector would rise by less than employment in the
firm concerned. People are thus more likely to gain
from upgrading when it involves most or all of the
firms in a sector or a country - an unsurprising
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conclusion, but one which is important in setting
policy priorities. In particular, it means that efforts
to reduce obstacles to upgrading which are
common to most firms should usually get more
emphasis than efforts to upgrade specific firms or
specific sectors.
Widespread upgrading of firms in a country would
usually raise the wages of all categories of workers,
but the gains would not necessarily be concentrated
on the poorest. If the upgraded sectors employed a
relatively high proportion of skilled workers, or if
the upgrading of firms within sectors required more
skilled workers to be hired, then the wages of
unskilled workers would rise by less than those of
skilled workers (and might even fall absolutely).
Unskilled workers would gain most if upgrading
was concentrated on sectors of low skill intensity
and did not reduce unskilled employment,
absolutely or relatively - for example, introducing
new or improved labour-intensive products.
However, many sorts of upgrading do not have
these characteristics. In the long term, moreover,
the developmental benefits of greater demand for
skilled workers, by strengthening incentives to
provide and acquire skills, might outweigh the
short-term disadvantages of increased wage
inequality
Whether and how governments should assist the
upgrading of firms in developing countries are
crucial questions to which the sceptical and
grudging answers of economists deserve to be
heard, especially because financial and administ-
rative resources are scarce and because firms have
obvious private motives for getting government
money The presumption of economists is not to
intervene, on the principle that firms themselves
will take care of their upgrading if (and to the extent
that) it is economically worthwhile. To override this
presumption, it is necessary to establish two things.
First, that there is a 'market failure' of some sort a
lack of finance or information, say that makes it
unprofitable to introduce a socially desirable
innovation. Second, that the benefits of intervent-
ion to correct this failure exceed the costs - and that
the proposed method of intervention is the best of
the possible alternatives.
Some proposals for government or external donor
intervention to assist firm upgrading would pass
both these tests, but others - perhaps the majority
- would fail one or other of them. I should
emphasise that many of the proposals that have
emerged from research in this area are in fact for
low-cost interventions to correct market failures,
for example by setting and monitoring quality
standards, or by spreading information and
improving coordination through business assoc-
iations. My concern is simply that the phrase
'assisting firm upgrading' could be misconstrued by
governments, donors and firms as an exhortation,
for example, to spend public money on modern
equipment for particular firms or to restrict
competition. It needs to be made clear that this is
not the intention.
Notes
* This article was first presented as a paper at the
Spreading of the Gains of Globalisation Workshop
held at the IDS in September 1999.
Adapting the title of Feenstra (1998).
Several economists have recently analysed the growth
of North-South intra-industry trade: Deardorff
(1998a, b): Feenstra (1998): Hummels et al. (1998);
Yeats (1998). However, they rarely use the label 'value
chain', but refer instead to 'fragmentation' (Deardorff),
'outsourcing' (Feenstra), 'vertical specialisation'
(Yeats), and 'production sharing' (Hummels). There is
also a long tradition of economic analysis of issues
relevant to value chains in the context of NorthSouth
trade in primary products (e.g. Singer 1950; Girvan
1987).
This concept of 'value added', incidentally, is rather
different from what businessmen usually mean by
'adding value'. In practice, statistical sectors are
aggregations of many products: thus many supply
chains. rather than just one, would start in each final
output sector; and some transactions between stages
of the supply chain would be hidden within sectors
(e.g. spinning and weaving are often aggregated into
the textiles sector).
See for example the discussion in Kravis et al, (1982).
It is sectoral unevenness of technology that matters for
comparative advantage and trade. If the technology of
one country were uniformly superior to that of
another country. its real wages would be higher, but it
would have no special advantage in any particular
sector.
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